Three incidents in under two weeks, at a perpetuals exchange, a mining-software provider and a derivatives tools firm, did not break a smart contract or a blockchain. Each went through a credential: an API key or the software that holds the keys.
Lighter, a decentralised perpetual futures exchange that settles on Ethereum, paused withdrawals and new pool creation on Monday after about 10.39 million USDC left its contract, which Bitquery traced to a wallet that swapped it for ether and sent part to Hyperliquid. Other researchers put potential losses at $15.5 million across two market-maker accounts, a figure Lighter has not confirmed.
We are actively investigating a security incident that appears to involve a single compromised external party.
— Lighter (@Lighter_xyz) November 16, 2026
As a precaution, we have temporarily suspended all withdrawals and pool creation while we investigate the circumstances and assess the full impact.
Lighter's postmortem, published about eight hours after the first withdrawal, said the attacker obtained private API keys through a trader's custom signing software that reused cryptographic nonces, which allowed the keys to be calculated from publicly available signatures. The attacker then used the keys to create a public pool from the affected account, moved the victim's funds into it and redeemed them through an attacker-controlled account.
Update:
— Lighter (@Lighter_xyz) November 16, 2026
Our investigation indicates that today’s incident was caused by a leaked API key for a specific trader's account. The Lighter protocol and smart contracts are unaffected.
As a precaution, we have enabled Guardian mode on our smart contract. Our main priority is to… https://t.co/LUuFiY5cK0
Lighter's own contracts were not compromised, and its Guardian mechanism paused withdrawals, which let its Security Council return about $5 million in USDC to the affected trader. Lighter later restored withdrawals and said Guardian mode had been disabled. It has added wallet signature requirements for public-pool transfers and non-public API key signatures, plans IP allowlists and configurable API key permissions, and advised traders using custom or third-party signing software to rotate their keys and switch to its official SDKs.
Deposits and withdrawals are back to normal following the deactivation of Guardian Mode by the Lighter Security Council.
— Lighter (@Lighter_xyz) November 16, 2026
More details on what happened: https://t.co/HLIw6E7UdO https://t.co/rYf8oXx7Du
On Saturday evening, November 14, attackers compromised Commander, Luxor's platform for monitoring and configuring large mining fleets from one dashboard, and redirected hashrate from just over a dozen customer accounts to the OCEAN pool. Luxor said its engineers patched Commander within two hours, that Luxor Pool and LuxOS firmware were unaffected and that no customer data was taken, and it promised to pay affected clients in full as if their machines had mined normally, Bitcoin.com reported .
Last night our internal monitoring alerted us to an unauthorized redirect of hashrate through Commander. Our on-call engineering team jumped on it right away.
— Luxor Technology ?⛏️ (@luxor) November 15, 2026
Impact: just over a dozen client accounts. Affected machines were pointed to a different pool for a limited window. No…
The damage was small. The payout address tied to the redirected hashrate received about 0.162 BTC, and no block was mined with the diverted power, BigGo reported . Its chief executive, Nick Hansen, attributed the attack to AI-enabled tools, and Luxor has promised a detailed report, so that claim is unverified for now.
The third case was covered in Blockhead's breach roundup . A compromised Telegram account at a third-party vendor was used to send a SignalPlus engineer a fake Microsoft Teams invitation, and Binance and Deribit revoked all API keys linked to the Hong Kong-based firm on November 5. SignalPlus had not made IP whitelisting mandatory for exchange API access. Binance told users to wait for confirmation that the issue was resolved and to turn on IP whitelisting before reconnecting keys. The same human route sits behind the Binance theft, where attackers used a fake job interview .
The cases fail at different layers. At Lighter, the weakness was how a trader's software generated signatures, so the key could be rebuilt from public data. At Luxor, it was the management layer that holds the settings for many customers' machines. At SignalPlus, it was a person who opened a meeting invite on a machine with access to exchange connections. None of them required defeating an exchange's matching engine or a chain's consensus.
The fixes converge. Lighter plans IP allowlists and scoped API permissions. Binance advised IP whitelisting after SignalPlus. Luxor's incident suggests that changes to a fleet's pool settings deserve the same controls as a withdrawal, since a single dashboard can redirect many machines at once. The recovery differs too: Lighter's Security Council could step in because its contract had a pause and intervention mechanism, while SignalPlus and Luxor relied on revoking keys and compensating users.
The dollar amounts are small next to Binance's $6.3 billion theft, but they are cheaper to repeat. Credentials can also be easier to harvest than private keys, because they sit in software, dashboards and chat apps that several parties touch.
We are anticipating Luxor's detailed report, which should show how attackers reached Commander and whether any AI tooling was involved.